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Abstract 
The 2014 European Parliament election saw a relatively large increase in the size of radical left 
parties (RLPs), particularly in Western Europe. This article aims to provide new ways of thinking 
about the dynamics of radical-left voting by analyzing the changing role of attitudes towards the 
European Union (EU) in explaining support for RLPs at European Parliament elections during the 
Great Recession. It is argued that the Europeanization of economic issues during the financial 
crisis, together with the particular kind of Euroscepticism advocated by these parties, have enabled 
them to successfully attract a heterogeneous pool of voters. Using the 2009 and 2014 European 
Elections Studies, it is shown that the effect of negative opinions about the EU on radical-left 
voting increased significantly during the crisis. In addition, support for RLPs also increased among 
voters with positive views of the EU who were nevertheless strongly dissatisfied with the 
economic situation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The relative growth of the European United Left/ Nordic Green Left group in the European 
Parliament (EP), up from 35 MEPs in 2009 to 52 in 2014,1 and the increase of support for radical 
left parties (RLPs) in some of the countries worst hit by the Eurozone crisis has put this party 
family back on the spotlight. While there is perhaps nothing surprising about challenger parties 
benefitting from the consequences of bad economic conditions, the way in which the economic 
crisis in Europe was intertwined with increasing intergovernmental bickering between member-
states and a clear decrease in public support for the European Union (EU) (Ross 2013) raises 
questions about the precise mechanisms explaining radical-left voting during the Great Recession. 
Has the radical left simply benefitted from voters’ dissatisfaction with the economy, or has the EU 
issue played a role in the relative success of RLPs in EP elections? 
 
The European polity has often been claimed to be too complicated and distant from citizens to be 
part of their everyday considerations and political calculations (Duchesne et al. 2013; Hurrelman 
et al. 2013). However, the consequences of the Great Recession may be calling for a partial recall 
of that conclusion. The radical left’s depiction of the EU as a politically-coloured, fundamentally 
neo-liberal project may have found an echo in the electorate in the context of the crisis, enabling 
RLPs to benefit not only from voters’ dissatisfaction with the economy but also from increasing 
negative attitudes towards the EU. 
 
                                                          
1 54 if we count MEPs from the Communist Party of Greece, which left the group in 2014. 
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To be sure, our understanding of the way in which RLPs have managed to attract support during 
the crisis is limited by two main obstacles. On the one hand, although research on the contemporary 
radical left has increased in the past few years, little is still known about the dynamics of support 
for these parties in Western Europe. Presumably this is a consequence of the electoral decline of 
traditional Communist parties during the 1970s and 1980s, which led many scholars to consider 
these parties as extremely minor and unworthy of study (Ramiro 2014). Many West European 
RLPs did nevertheless survive the fall of the Soviet Bloc, and in some cases their support even 
increased over the years, giving them opportunities to play a more relevant role in their countries' 
politics. The second major obstacle faced by scholars interested in the radical left is that the link 
between Euroscepticism and the electoral support of RLPs has only been tangentially investigated. 
The relationship between opinions about the EU and support for the radical left is bound to be 
more complicated that it is, for example, for the radical right (see Werts et al. 2013). Not only is 
the EU a dividing issue for many RLPs (Dunphy 2004; Dunphy and March 2013), but also these 
parties’ version of Euroscepticism is ambiguous enough to enable them to advocate European 
integration while attacking the EU at their will.  
  
This article aims to provide new ways of thinking about the dynamics of radical-left voting and its 
relationship with Euroscepticism. It is argued that during the economic crisis the radical left has 
been particularly successful, and increasingly so, in reaching out to a heterogeneous group of 
voters including not only left-wing Eurosceptics but also fundamentally pro-EU voters who were 
disappointed by the economic consequences of the crisis. The article employs data from the 2009 
and 2014 European Election Study (EES) and analyzes the impact of economic evaluations and 
opinions about the EU on voters' support for the radical left in EP elections, focusing specifically 
on how the effect of these factors has evolved between 2009 (when the consequences of the Euro-
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crisis were still not fully evident) and 2014. We find that the role of both bad economic evaluations 
and negative opinions about the EU in explaining radical-left voting increased significantly 
between both elections. In other words, Eurosceptic voters and those who were dissatisfied with 
the economy were even more likely to vote for RLPs in 2014 than they were in 2009. Moreover, 
we also find that, in contrast with 2009, negative economic evaluations significantly increased 
support for RLPs among individuals with positive opinions about EU membership in 2014. 
Overall, findings suggest that the economic crisis has not just strengthened the importance of 
Euroscepticism as a determinant of the radical left’s support but it has also enabled RLPs to attract 
pro-EU voters who were nevertheless concerned with the economic situation. In the conclusion 
we discuss the implications of these findings for the future development of European integration 
and the strategies of the radical left. 
 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we review previous research on RLPs  and 
economic Euroscepticism. Our hypotheses are presented in Section 3. We then move on to describe 
the data and methods that will be employed in the empirical analysis. Findings are then presented 
in Section 5 before the article concludes with a discussion and directions for future research.  
 
SUPPORT FOR THE RADICAL LEFT AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU 
Despite the limited attention paid to the radical left in the literature, there are plenty of examples 
of electorally and politically relevant RLPs, particularly in Western Europe. The Progressive Party 
of Working People, AKEL, a formally Marxist-Leninist party that has been electorally successful 
in Cyprus since the island’s independence from Britain in the 1960s, is perhaps the clearest case 
of an electorally relevant RLP in Europe. However, significant cases of recent electoral success 
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can be found in other parts of the continent. Some of the countries worst hit by the economic crisis 
(particularly Greece, Spain and Portugal) have recently attracted much interest precisely because 
of the particularly successful results achieved by the radical left there. Examples of relatively 
important RLPs can also be found farther north of the Mediterranean Sea, including the Socialist 
Party in the Netherlands, Die Linke (The Left) in Germany, or the Left Alliance in Finland to name 
just a few.  To be sure, RLPs are not present in every country, and some of them have also suffered 
important electoral declines. However, the electoral support of RLPs in Western Europe is actually 
on a par with that of radical right parties.  
 
It is obvious that not all RLPs in the countries mentioned above come from the same political 
tradition or follow exactly the same ideological principles, but there is consensus in the literature 
that all of them are part of the same family, which includes not only traditional communist parties 
(Marxist-Leninist or reformed) but also other parties such as radical socialists, social populists and 
even some red-green parties (March 2011). Following March (2011: 8) and March and Mudde 
(2005) all members of the radical left family share the following characteristics: a) they are 
ideologically located to the left of social democratic and green parties; b) they reject contemporary 
capitalism (ranging from opposition to neoliberalism to rejection of private property and capitalist 
profit), advocating alternative economic and power structures; and c) they put great emphasis on 
economic and social inequality, proposing radical redistributive policies.   
 
Until recently, most of the literature on RLPs used to focus on a single party or a comparison of a 
handful of them (e.g. Bull 1995; Hudson 2012; Botella and Ramiro 2003; Backes and Moreau 
2008; Vasilopoulos et al., 2015). The first large attempt to study RLPs in a comparative way was 
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carried out by March (2011), who in his seminal work analyzes the development of these parties 
from 1990 to 2008 using aggregate data and employing vote share as dependent variable. In 
relation to attitudes to the EU, March and Rommerskirchen (2011; 2015) conclude that RLPs are 
more successful in countries with higher levels of public Euroscepticism, though the aggregate 
nature of their analysis did not enable them to analyze whether this is because radical-left voters 
are actually more Eurosceptic than other voters or whether it is more Eurosceptic societies that 
tend to also generate larger RLPs. They also find radical-left voting to increase with higher levels 
of unemployment but not with economic growth, even though their data do not cover the period 
after the start of the Great Recession. 
 
It is worth noting that, although March and Rommerskirchen's (2011; 2015) seminal work focuses 
on RLPs in Europe as a whole, more recent work has taken a different approach arguing that we 
must be careful drawing conclusions from analyses that group Western and Eastern European 
RLPs together (Ramiro 2016; Gomez et al. 2016). The few RLPs that survived the transition to 
liberal democracy in Eastern and Central Europe are direct or indirect successors of the formerly 
ruling communist parties and, as March and Mudde (2005: 3) argue, the success of many of them 
is “explicable by several factors not relevant beyond the former Iron Curtain”. 
 
Other studies of radical-left voting, all of them focusing exclusively on West European countries, 
have opted for employing individual-level data. Thus, Visser et al. (2013) provide an interesting 
comparative analysis of radical left attitudes, although they focus on individuals with a radical-left 
ideology rather than supporters of RLPs. Lubbers and Scheepers (2007), on the other hand, analyze 
the relationship between Euroscepticism and extreme voting patterns, comparing the effect of 
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attitudes towards European integration between radical-right and radical-left voters. Interestingly 
enough, in contrast with radical-right voters, who are clearly and significantly Eurosceptic, they 
only find a small and barely significant effect of Euroscepticism on radical-left voting.  
 
To date, the most comprehensive individual-level studies of radical-left voting can be found in 
Ramiro (2016) and Gomez et al. (2016), who analyze the individual-level characteristics of radical-
left voters in Western Europe during the period 1989-2009. Ramiro (2016) finds that supporters 
of RLPs are younger than voters of other parties, have a stronger working-class identity, and are 
more likely to be union members and urban dwellers. Furthermore, they are also less religious and 
less satisfied with the democratic system than voters of other parties. When it comes to attitudes 
towards European integration, Ramiro (2016) finds that radical-left voters present significantly 
higher levels of Euroscepticism than voters of other parties. Gomez et al. (2016) confirm the link 
between Euroscepticism and radical-left voting, although they find that its intensity varies 
significantly across types of RLP. More specifically, Traditional/Orthodox RLPs tend to attract 
more Eurosceptic voters than New Left RLPs, at least during the period that they analyze.  
 
A positive relationship between Euroscepticism and support for the radical left is coherent with 
the position traditionally held by RLPs with regard to European integration. The kind of 
Euroscepticism advocated by the radical left is based on the evaluation of the EU's economic and 
social returns rather than based (at least nominally) on national / identity-related issues. As Hooghe 
et al. (2002) demonstrate, the radical left family presents, together with the radical right, the lowest 
levels of support for European integration. This view is supported by other scholars who argue that 
parties on the periphery of the party system are more likely to hold negative attitudes towards the 
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EU (Taggart 1998; Ray 2007). Although some scholars have actually claimed that both radical-
left and radical-right Euroscepticism are largely based on (different interpretations of) nationalism 
(Halikiopoulou et al. 2012), the Euroscepticism of RLPs cannot be fully equated to right-wing 
Euroscepticism. Left-wing Euroscepticism is based on concerns about the effects of integration on 
social protection and on the capacity of national governments to carry out redistributive policies, 
whereas right-wing Euroscepticism is generally linked to the defence of the national culture and 
traditions and opposition to immigration (Hooghe and Marks 2007).  
 
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008) refer to RLPs’ position on the EU as soft Euroscepticism, which 
involves opposition to the current trajectory of the EU rather than principled rejection of 
supranationalism. In practice, however, the interpretation of what it means to reject the current 
European project does vary significantly across parties, with some RLPs showing almost complete 
opposition to the EU and everything that it entails while others hope to be able to change it from 
within (Charalambous 2011). Dunphy (2004) claims that the term Euroscepticism is too bold to 
identify the position of RLPs in relation to the EU. He argues that, by the mid 1980s, four strands 
of thought could be identified not only across but also within RLPs: a) those who reject the EU 
outright as an agent of multinational capitalism; b) those who share the same concerns as the 
former but think withdrawal is unrealistic and even undesirable; c) those who are also critical of 
the EU but see it as a potential instrument to achieve traditional left-wing goals that can no longer 
be achieved by nation-states on their own in the era of globalization; and d) those who provide 
critical support of the EU, including all the Treaties and the Euro, as necessary tools for the 
construction of a more integrated Europe.2 In the last couple of decades these four strands have, 
                                                          
2 The only major party within this last strand was the Italian Communist Party before its dissolution in 1991. 
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nevertheless, evolved into a dychotomy between ‘sovereignists’ and ‘Europeanists’ (Dunphy 
2004; Dunphy and March 2013). Moreover, since the beginning of the 1990s the majority of parties 
within the radical left family have adopted a more nuanced position and do not support withdrawal 
of the EU (Charalambous 2011). The Portuguese and the Greek Communist Parties are clear 
exceptions to this rule, although Treib (2014) goes as far as to argue that nowadays the only 
existing case of fundamental opposition to the EU is the Communist Party of Greece.3  
 
In sum, RLPs are strongly internationalist; they tend to advocate international cooperation and the 
political integration of the peoples of Europe, but reject the European project as it currently stands 
on the grounds that, instead of promoting radical democracy, solidarity, equality and self-
determination, the EU is increasingly focused on the imposition of neo-liberal economic principles 
across all member-states (March and Mudde 2005; Hooghe and Marks 2007). This position of 
calculated ambiguity enables RLPs to soften or harden their stances without having to change the 
overall framework of support for integration and opposition to the current goals, results and/or 
institutional architecture of the EU that they work with. Thus, soft Euroscepticism may well be the 
position of most West European RLPs nowadays (Charalambous 2011), but the inflammatory 
rhetoric about the EU has arguably increased over the past few years with renewed criticism of the 
Treaties, the “technocrats” of the European Commission, and a Euro that is “at the exclusive 
service of financial markets” (PEL 2014: 1).  
 
                                                          
3 In practice, differences are very minor. The Portuguese Communist Party does not advocate complete withdrawal 
from the EU but its hollowing out through its transformation into an intergovernmental organization for the 
cooperation between “free and equal sovereign states” and the reversal of economic integration (PCP 2014). 
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To date, the link between Eurosceptic attitudes and support for the radical left has only been 
analyzed from the point of view of testing whether Euroscepticism leads to a higher probability to 
vote for RLPs. Although there is evidence that the radical left is able to mobilize feelings of 
economic anxiety through Euroscepticism (De Vries and Edwards 2009), little is known about the 
interaction between economic concerns and negative opinions about the EU during an economic 
crisis. We believe the series of economic and political crises that the EU has gone through since 
the start of the Great Recession provide a perfect opportunity to investigate this. To what extent 
has Euroscepticism played a significant role in explaining the relative success of RLPs in EP 
elections? Are negative economic evaluations driving Eurosceptic voters towards the radical left? 
Or has the economic downturn helped the radical left, with its economically-based criticism of 
European integration, successfully attract a more significant group of pro-EU voters on the 
grounds of dissatisfaction with the economic situation?  
 
To answer these questions, we will examine voting behaviour in the 2009 and 2014 EP elections. 
The European electoral arena seems appropriate to investigate the role of Euroscepticism on RLPs’ 
support. Moreover, voters in European elections are more likely to be free from strategic concerns 
when they cast a vote (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996), which enables us to examine a wider range 
of radical left supporters than it tends to be the case for national elections.  
 
In what follows, we explain why we expect the Great Recession to have enabled RLPs to 
successfully forge a heterogeneous electoral coalition of Eurosceptic and pro-EU voters in 
European elections.  
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RADICAL LEFT VOTING DURING THE GREAT RECESSION 
 
In Europe, the Great Recession has not only been associated with an economic crisis but also with 
a number of political crises at both European and national level (Kriesi 2015). The response of the 
EU to the sovereign debt crisis that began at the end of 2009 was certainly erratic, not least because 
the Treaties did not contain any specific provision about what to do in such a scenario. Most 
decisions, ranging from the creation of new financial mechanisms to the development of bailout 
programmes, had to be made by intergovernmental institutions that exposed profound divisions 
between member-states, were unable to promote a legitimate solution to the crisis and had to face, 
probably as a result, increasing public disaffection towards the EU (Fabbrini 2013; Ross 2013). It 
can be argued that the length and depth of the crisis, as well as the political disturbances it has 
produced, has contributed to politicizing the European issue (Statham and Trenz 2015), opening 
up new political opportunities for challenger parties, and perhaps particularly so in second order 
elections. Dissatisfaction with national and European elites and their management of the crisis has 
led to general losses of incumbent parties, increasing levels of Euro-rejectionism, and anti-
austerity protests in many European countries (van Gent et al. 2013). We expect this scenario to 
have largely benefitted RLPs in two ways: a) by attracting an increasing amount of voters 
dissatisfied with the EU, and b) by spreading contestation among supporters of integration.  
 
On the one hand, the radical left’s criticism of European integration may have increasingly found 
an echo in the electorate during the crisis, especially among those whom Weßels (2007) calls 
critical Europeans: supporters of European integration who are nevertheless critical of various 
aspects of it. RLPs have shown absolute opposition to the measures taken by European institutions 
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during the financial crisis, including automatic sanctions to discipline fiscal offenders, debt brakes 
and the austerity measures set by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (the ‘troika’) for those countries that needed to be bailed out as a 
result of the sovereign debt crisis.4 While RLPs attribute the responsibility of the crisis to the 
neoliberal/capitalist system and its elites, including both national governments and the EU, their 
attacks on the European elites during the crisis may have proved particularly attractive to those 
with negative opinions about the EU.  We therefore hypothesize that opinions about EU 
membership have become significantly more important in explaining the radical left’s support 
during the Great Recession: 
 
H1. Support for RLPs is higher among voters with negative opinions about the EU. 
H2. In the course of the economic crisis, the effect of negative opinions about the EU on support 
for RLPs has become significantly stronger. 
 
The fact that the Great Recession was linked with a series of political crises in Europe does not 
mean that the effect of economic evaluations on the electoral prospects of RLPs can be 
overlooked. If left-wing voters are particularly driven by economic concerns (van der Brug et al. 
2007), then that may be one of the reasons behind the growth of the radical left in recent years. 
Considering the difference of economic contexts, we may expect the economic dimension to be a 
stronger determinant of radical-left voting in 2014 than in 2009. Although the global financial 
crisis started in September 2008, it is only from mid-2009 and early 2010 that the heart of the 
                                                          
4 As expressed by the Party of European Left: ‘Popular sovereignties have been flouted by the centralisation of powers 
in technocratic institutions executed by the «Troïka» (the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission)"’(PEL, 2013: 
5) 
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crisis started to unfold, especially in the Eurozone, with the debt crisis of 2009. Unemployment 
rates, on the other hand, kept rising from an EU average of 9% in 2009 (9.5% in the Euro zone) 
to 11% in 2014 (12% in the Euro zone), with drastic variations among the member-states (World 
Bank 2015). As a result, one of the consequences of the Great Recession may have been a 
stronger relationship between economic evaluations and support for the radical left. Our next two 
hypotheses are, therefore, as follows:  
 
H3. Support for RLPs increases with negative evaluations of the economy. 
H4. In the course of the crisis the effect of negative economic evaluations on support for RLPs 
has become significantly stronger. 
 
Finally, the conjunction of economic crisis and the particular type of Euroscepticism advocated by 
the radical left, with a strong focus on the economic aspects of integration (austerity, 
neoliberalism), may have enabled these parties to galvanize support among two very different 
groups of voters including not just those with negative opinions about EU membership, but also 
individuals who are generally positive about membership but were critical of the economic 
situation during the crisis and the way it was dealt with by the mainstream parties. As with our 
previous hypotheses, we also expect this effect to become all the more evident as the crisis unfolds. 
Our last two hypotheses can therefore be put as follows: 
 
H5. EU supporters are significantly more likely to support RLPs when they are dissatisfied with 
the state of the economy 
 
H6: The effect of economic dissatisfaction has become stronger for EU supporters in the course 
of the crisis 
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In the next section, we explain the research strategy and the data that will be employed to test 
these hypotheses. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
To test our hypotheses, we rely on the 2009 and 2014 European Election Studies (EES). These 
cross-country surveys were conducted in all member-states directly after the European Parliament 
elections of June 2009 and May 2014. As explained above, the dynamics of support for the radical 
left are likely to be hardly comparable between West European and post-communist countries, so 
we have restricted our analysis to the former. Among those, 15 countries had radical left parties or 
platforms running for the 2009 and 2014 elections that could be identified in the surveys: Denmark 
(Socialist People's Party), Finland (Left Alliance), Sweden (Left Party), Greece (Greek Communist 
Party; and SY.RY.ZA - Coalition of the Radical Left), Spain (United Left; and Podemos -We Can, 
which did not exist in 2009), Portugal (Left Bloc; and Unitary Democratic Coalition), Italy (2009: 
Communist Refoundation; and Communist Party of Workers; 2014: The Other Europe with 
Tsipras), Cyprus (Progressive Party of Working People), France (Left Front; Workers’ Struggle; 
and New Anticapitalist Party), Belgium (Walloon and Flemish Workers’ Party of Belgium: PTB-
go! and PVDA), Luxembourg (The Left), Ireland (Socialist Party; and People Before Profit 
Alliance, which did not run in 2009),5 Germany (The Left), the Netherlands (Socialist Party), and 
Austria (Communist Party of Austria, only in 2009), for a total of 24 RLPs. 
 
                                                          
5 Consistently with the literature, Sinn Féin has been excluded from the Irish case due to its history as a nationalist 
party. Results (available on request) do not change with its inclusion.  
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In order to account for the clustering of observations, we employ hierarchical logistic regression  
models with random effects by country (15 level-2 units). Don’t know answers and refusals were 
coded as missing and excluded from the analysis.  
 
The dependent variable is a binary measure of declared vote for RLPs in the 2009 and 2014 EP 
elections. It is coded ‘1’ when respondents declared to have voted for one of the 24 RLPs, and ‘0’ 
otherwise. Regarding the independent variables, economic evaluations are measured by a binary 
variable that distinguishes between respondents who thought the economic situation had worsened 
compared to the previous year (value ‘1’), and those who thought it had either improved or 
remained the same (value ‘0’).  To investigate attitudes towards integration we rely on the 
traditional measure of diffuse support: the ‘membership question’ (Brinegar and Jolly 2004), 
whereby respondents are asked whether their country’s membership of the EU is a bad thing (value 
‘1’), neither bad nor good (value ‘2’), or a good thing (value ‘3’). 
 
All models include a dummy accounting for the EP election year. As we are interested in 
changes in the impact of these variables during the economic crisis, we also include separate 
models where the relevant independent variables (and interactions) are interacted with the 
dummy accounting for the 2014 election. This enables us to assess if the effects of such variables 
have increased over the course of the economic crisis or not.  
 
Finally, based on previous research on radical-left voters (Ramiro, 2014), we include the following 
controls: age (continuous measure), level of education (4-point scale), gender (binary variable 
where ‘1’ is female), union membership (binary variable), urbanization of place of residence 
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(binary variable where ‘1’ corresponds to those living a large city or a large city’s suburbs), being 
unemployed (binary variable) and being a manual worker (binary variable). We also include a 10-
point measure of left-right self-placement, and a binary variable indicating support for the 
government. Variables are standardized to allow for comparisons of coefficients. 
 
RESULTS 
 
We conducted a number of hierarchical logistic regression models to test Hypotheses 1-6. All 
models are displayed in Table 1 below, where odd ratios are reported. For the sake of clarity, 
marginal effects for all interactions are displayed in Figures 1 to 4. 
 
Before turning to our variables of interest, it is worth describing the effect of control variables. 
Results (Model 1 Table 1) are similar to previous findings in the literature. RLPs’ voters are 
younger than voters of other parties (a one standard-deviation increase in age yields a 7% decrease 
in the likelihood to vote for a RLP, although the effect is only significant at p<0.1), and they also 
tend to live in large cities or suburbs (urban voters are 15% more likely to vote for RLPs than 
voters living in small cities or rural areas). Left-right self-placement and support for the 
government are also, as expected, strong predictors of radical-left voting, but there is no clear 
effect of gender or education on the likelihood to support a RLP. In contrast with Ramiro (2016), 
however, we do not find strong evidence that manual workers or unemployed people are more 
likely to vote for the radical left.  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Together with socio-demographic controls, Model 1 (Table 1) includes variables accounting for 
economic evaluations and opinions about EU membership. This enables us to test whether support 
for RLPs increases with negative opinions about the EU (Hypothesis 1). We will come back to this 
model later on when we address the effect of economic evaluations on the support of RLPs. 
Regarding Hypothesis 1, positive attitudes towards integration have, as expected, a negative and 
statistically significant effect on the probability to choose a RLP. A one-standard-deviation 
increase in support for membership decreases the odds of voting for RLPs by 18% (Odds 
ratio=0.82). To be more precise, the probability to vote for a RLP is 8% for voters who think EU 
membership is a bad thing, 7% for those who have a neutral position, and 6% for those who think 
EU membership is a good thing for their country (all marginal effects are significant at p<0.01). 
 
Moving on to Hypothesis 2, it was previously argued that the politicization of the EU during the 
economic crisis may have increased the effect of Euroscepticism on support for RLPs. As a 
consequence, voters with negative attitudes towards the EU should be more likely to support RLPs 
in 2014 than they were in 2009.  To assess whether this is the case, Model 2 includes an interaction 
between opinions about membership and election year (the 2014 dummy variable). The interaction 
is statistically significant and positive. As interaction effects cannot be properly interpreted by 
looking at coefficients, Figure 1 shows the predicted probability to support the radical left 
according to voters’ opinions about EU membership in 2009 and 2014. As can be seen, attitudes 
towards the EU do not seem to have played any role at all in the 2009 European election. In fact, 
the probability to support a RLP was around the same (≈ 4%) for Eurosceptics (declaring 
membership is a bad thing), ambivalents (neither good nor bad category) and EU-supporters 
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(declaring membership is a good thing). In contrast, in the 2014 European election support for 
RLPs significantly increased with negative opinions about the EU, with support for RLPs being 6 
percentage points lower for EU-supporters (11%) than for Eurosceptics (17%). Consistently with 
our hypothesis, the effect of the European dimension was not very evident at first but became much 
stronger over the course of the crisis.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to assess the effects of economic evaluations we need to look back at Model 1. 
Consistently with Hypothesis 3, findings show that the odds of choosing a RLP are 19% higher 
for voters with negative retrospective evaluations than for those with positive or neutral 
evaluations (odds ratio=1.19). The relationship is positive, as expected, and statistically significant 
(p<0.05), but the effect is small (the probability to vote for a RLP is 6% when voters hold 
positive/neutral evaluations of the economy and 6.9% when they hold negative evaluations). 
Nevertheless, we hypothesized that the impact of economic evaluations should have been stronger 
in 2014 than in 2009 (Hypothesis 4). This is tested in Model 3, which introduces an interaction 
between the variable accounting for retrospective economic evaluations and the election year. The 
interaction is statistically significant. In order to better interpret this effect, Figure 2 displays the 
predicted probabilities of voting for a RLP in both election years for voters with different economic 
evaluations. The effect of economic evaluations does clearly change between 2009 and 2014. In 
2009, voters with a negative evaluation of the economy were almost as likely to support a RLP as 
voters with positive or neutral evaluations. Moving from a positive or neutral evaluation to a 
negative evaluation involved a tiny decrease of about 0.6 percentage points in the probability to 
This is the authors’ accepted version of a manuscript published in West European Politics 
http://tandfonline.com/toc/fwep20/current 
19 
 
vote for the radical left, but the effect is barely significant (p = 0.09). In 2014, however, support 
for RLPs was 4 percentage points higher among those with a negative view of the economy 
(p<0.01). Surprisingly enough, economic evaluations were not central in explaining the radical 
left’s support in 2009 but their impact significantly increased in 2014, when they played a 
relatively more important role. 
 
Finally, we test whether economic evaluations had a different impact on voters depending on their 
attitudes towards European integration. As argued earlier, RLPs’ particular version of 
Euroscepticism and their opposition to austerity may have allowed these parties to attract not only 
Eurosceptical voters but also supporters of European integration who were nonetheless dissatisfied 
with the consequences of the economic crisis (Hypothesis 5). To test this hypothesis, Model 4 
introduces an interaction between opinions about EU membership and economic evaluations. As 
can be seen, the interaction is significant, the odds ratios suggesting that negative evaluations of 
the economy may have actually increased RLPs’ attractiveness for certain groups of pro-EU 
voters. For ease of interpretation, the interaction effects are displayed in Figure 3, which shows 
changes in the probability to support a RLP when voters move from a positive/neutral to a negative 
evaluation of the economy. Positive numbers mean that the probability to vote for a RLP increases 
when voters hold a negative view of the economy, with negative numbers reflecting the opposite. 
In order to analyse whether the effect of economic evaluations differs depending on voters’ 
opinions about the EU, the figures are calculated for three types of voters: those who think EU 
membership is ‘a good thing’, those who think EU membership is ‘a bad thing’, and those who 
think it is neither good nor bad. As can be seen, pro-EU voters are 1.6 points more likely to support 
a RLP when they hold a negative view of the economy, and the effect is statistically significant. 
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In contrast, confidence intervals overlap with the ‘zero effect’ line for both Eurosceptic voters and 
those with neutral opinions about the EU, providing very weak evidence that economic evaluations 
have any effect at all for these two groups of voters. 
 
Of course, the former effect does not distinguish between elections, but according to Hypothesis 
6 the interaction between bad economic evaluations and positive opinions about the EU may have 
become significantly stronger in 2014, enabling RLPs to mobilize pro-EU voters who were 
anxious about the economy. Model 5 tests this last hypothesis by introducing a triple interaction 
between opinions about EU membership, economic evaluations and election year. To facilitate the 
interpretation of the effects, Figure 4 displays the change in the probability to vote for a RLP 
resulting from negative evaluations of the economy, and it does so for voters with different 
opinions about EU membership (just as in Figure 3) and by election year. Once again, the logic 
changes dramatically between 2009 and 2014. In 2009, negative economic evaluations did not 
increase the chances of pro-EU voters to support the radical left in 2009, nor did they affect support 
for this party family among Eurosceptics or voters with neutral opinions about the EU (all 
confidence intervals overlap with zero). In contrast, voters with neutral opinions and, particularly, 
pro-EU voters were significantly affected by economic evaluations in 2014 (but Eurosceptics were 
probably not, as the effect is not statistically significant). In that year, when voters with a positive 
view of EU membership evaluated the economy negatively, their probability to support a RLP 
increased by 6 percentage points. Importantly enough, this roughly equates the relative advantage 
that RLPs had among Eurosceptic voters in 2014 (see comments on Figure 1 above). These 
findings provide strong support for Hypothesis 6 and suggest that, as expected, the electorate of 
RLPs was more heterogeneous in 2014 than it was in 2009. In addition to hard Eurosceptics, the 
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radical left’s position on Europe and on the management of the economic crisis has also enabled 
them to attract voters who support EU membership but perhaps share some of the criticism made 
by RLPs about the way the crisis has been handled by both European and national elites. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The final declaration of the 2nd European Left Congress, the platform coordinating an important 
number of European RLPs’ action for the 2009 European elections, stated very clearly the general 
orientation for that campaign: further integration but not along the lines of the currently existing 
European project (PEL 2007). The radical left’s critical stance against the economic orientation of 
the EU was doubled with a commitment to change the political direction of European institutions. 
In the 2014 manifesto, while still actively calling for a re-foundation of the EU, the European 
Left’s take on Europe had hardened and focused more strongly on the ‘ultraliberalism’ imposed 
by the European ‘technocrats’ with the complicity of national governments (PEL 2014). This 
appeal to an alternative European project echoes the two characteristics we found in the pool of 
RLPs’ supporters during the economic crisis.  
Radical left supporters are likely to call for an alternative European project, but not all of them 
would like to call off integration. Rather than find RLPs’ pool of supporters unanimously 
Eurosceptic, we find that the crisis has actually enabled these parties to build a heterogeneous 
coalition of support. On the one hand, RLPs have been successful in retaining and attracting 
Eurosceptic voters. Negative attitudes towards the EU do not seem to explain much of the support 
of RLPs in the 2009 EP elections, but their impact significantly increased over the course of the 
crisis. In 2014, people who thought EU membership was a ‘bad thing’ for their country were 
This is the authors’ accepted version of a manuscript published in West European Politics 
http://tandfonline.com/toc/fwep20/current 
22 
 
significantly more likely to vote for the radical left than those who thought EU membership was 
good. In spite of this, as the economic crisis unfolded RLPs have also been able to take advantage 
of their economically-based Euroscepticism and their opposition to austerity to attract pro-EU 
voters who are nevertheless deeply dissatisfied with the handling of the economic situation – a 
logic that was not yet at play in 2009. At the time of the 2009 EP elections, the state of the economy 
was nothing near the turmoil of 2010 and subsequent years in Europe. The 2014 elections were, 
however, different, and our results help us understand the 50% increase in the number of seats 
secured by the radical left.  
 
Findings in this paper have two fundamental implications. First, they reflect the changing nature 
of the radical left’s electorate during times of crisis. The ambiguous discourse of the radical left 
regarding European integration was designed to combine their internationalism with a strong 
opposition to the economic fundamentals of the EU. While most RLPs do not reject integration as 
an abstract goal, the way the crisis was handled by European institutions may have made evident 
to them that opposing the ‘current’ model of integration may involve rejecting almost every single 
stone that the European project has been set upon. Indeed, findings suggest that RLPs’ support is 
increasingly based on Euroscepticism, even though the economic crisis has enabled them to appeal 
to both hard Eurosceptics and groups of voters with a more positive view of the EU.  It remains to 
be seen how this will affect the position of RLPs vis-à-vis the EU in the future, and particularly in 
European elections. Most RLPs are internally divided over the EU issue (Dunphy 2004), which 
might prevent them from adopting a more principled oposition to integration. However, if the 
effect of Euroscepticism does not fade out, they might as well decide to keep playing a card that 
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seems to be having good electoral returns and put criticism of the EU higher on their agenda in 
order to attract more voters.  
 
The implications of our findings go beyond the radical left, as they suggest that the economic and 
political crisis may have activated the European dimension among certain groups of voters -at least 
in European elections. The European issue now matters not only to radical-right voters but also, 
increasingly, to radical-left voters. Indeed, the finding that Euroscepticism has become a more 
significant element in explaining radical-left voting may have substantial consequences for 
political competition at the national level. The centre-left has been shown to be particularly 
affected by Eurosceptic contagion from both the radical right and the radical left, but in order for 
this contagion to take place it is essential that Eurosceptic challengers regard EU issues to be 
important (Meijers 2015). Electoral dynamics in the radical left camp may provide important 
incentives for this to happen, which opens avenues for further research. It remains to be seen 
whether the dynamics observed in EP elections are also present in national elections. Research has 
demonstrated that, although EP and national elections are not different from each other with regard 
to the variables predicting voting behaviour, the second-order nature of the former decreases 
voters’ incentives to vote tactically and increases their likelihood to cast a protest vote (van der 
Eijk and Franklin 1996).  
Finally, our results call for further research in order to investigate the duality of RLPs’ 
supporters. In particular, the lack of information in the surveys did not enable us to use additional 
indicators of opinion about European integration (in particular to differentiate between diffuse 
support, and opinion towards the EU and its policies). It is possible that many of those voters we 
identify as being pro-EU are in fact soft Eurosceptics who see EU membership as something good 
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for their country but oppose the perceived political orientation of European institutions and/or the 
way these have handled the crisis. While that would not change our main conclusions regarding a 
more Eurosceptic twist in the radical-left electorate, it would definitely help us better understand 
the changes taken place within the radical left’s electorate during the crisis. 
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TABLES  
 
Table 1. Assessing the effects of attitudes towards integration and the economy on radical-left 
voting 
 
DV= vote intention for RLP Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  OR OR OR OR OR 
2014 European election  4.745*** 9.668*** 3.152*** 4.853*** 8.014*** 
 (0.347) (2.087) (0.342) (0.357) (3.223) 
Support for membership 0.820*** 0.963 0.827*** 0.686*** 0.892 
 (0.0349) (0.0607) (0.0353) (0.0452) (0.117) 
   2014*Membership  0.748***   0.691** 
  (0.0615)   (0.104) 
Negative economic evaluation 1.192** 1.175** 0.824* 0.589** 0.681 
 (0.0833) (0.0821) (0.0828) (0.126) (0.269) 
 2014*Negative eco evaluation   1.930***  0.922 
   (0.259)  (0.442) 
Negative eco eval*Membership    1.335*** 1.083 
    (0.110) (0.160) 
2014*Negative eco eval*Membership     1.357* 
     (0.249) 
Left-right scale 0.268*** 0.266*** 0.270*** 0.266*** 0.267*** 
 (0.00960) (0.00956) (0.00966) (0.00957) (0.00962) 
Supports the government 0.515*** 0.520*** 0.510*** 0.521*** 0.520*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0379) (0.0372) (0.0380) (0.0380) 
Gender=female 0.960 0.951 0.947 0.955 0.937 
 (0.0568) (0.0564) (0.0562) (0.0566) (0.0557) 
Age 0.933* 0.933* 0.937 0.935* 0.938 
 (0.0368) (0.0368) (0.0370) (0.0369) (0.0371) 
Education: 16-19 yrs old 0.931 0.930 0.939 0.931 0.939 
(reference=15 yrs old) (0.0905) (0.0907) (0.0915) (0.0905) (0.0917) 
Education: 20+ yrs old 0.923 0.923 0.940 0.920 0.937 
 (0.0904) (0.0907) (0.0924) (0.0902) (0.0923) 
Education: still in education 0.985 0.982 1.002 0.991 1.003 
 (0.163) (0.162) (0.166) (0.164) (0.166) 
Union membership 1.217*** 1.222*** 1.234*** 1.215*** 1.236*** 
 (0.0905) (0.0910) (0.0920) (0.0905) (0.0923) 
City: large cities or suburbs 1.148** 1.147** 1.150** 1.148** 1.149** 
 (0.0719) (0.0719) (0.0722) (0.0720) (0.0722) 
Manual worker 1.020 1.035 1.026 1.025 1.035 
 (0.0801) (0.0814) (0.0806) (0.0805) (0.0815) 
Unemployed 1.183 1.179 1.169 1.182 1.161 
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 (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) 
N 19,207 19,207 19,207 19,207 19,207 
Countries 15 15 15 15 15 
BIC 8163.4 8160.8 8149.7 8161.1 8157.3 
Standard errors in brackets. *** p <0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1    
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FIGURES 
Figure 1. Probability to support a RLP by opinions on EU membership in 2009 and 2014 (95% 
confidence intervals). 
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Figure 2. Probability to support a RLP by economic evaluations in 2009 and 2014 (95% C.I.): 
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Figure 3. Average marginal effects of negative economic evaluation on the probability to vote 
for a RLP by opinion on EU membership (95% C.I.). 
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Figure 4. Average marginal effects of negative economic evaluation on the probability to vote 
for a RLP by opinion on EU membership and year (95% C.I.). 
 
